000 describe the conditions of the Lolo in the Ta-liang and Hsiao-liang Shan area.

133 It has been mentioned before that the main range of Ta-liang Shan is oriented from north to south. On the eastern side of the southernmost mountain range are eight sections of small ridges, which consitute the foothills. These start from Ta-ku Tui in the north and extend southward to the banks of the Chin-sha Chiang, all in an easterly direction, to give Liang Shan the shape of a multiple-legged insect; they all end at the side of the Hsi-su Ho. These eight ridges are commonly known as Pa Sai. The southern section of the Pa Sai faces the river with its steep overhanging cliffs, while its northern section connects with the Lung-t'ou Shan where there are many precipices and ancient forests. During the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties the 175 Chinese emperors made great efforts to develop this frontier 648 area. From 1796 until 1821, Chinese influence gradually reached the eastern part of Huang-mao Kang. In 1838 a rebellion started. The Lolo occupied the Ta-ku Tui and Hsiao-ku Tui, and the Chinese army had to retreat to Shan-Leng Kang, where they constructed a fortress for self-defense. They also established an outpost at Ma-ching-tzu as a support for Shan-Leng Kang. All Han-Chinese who lived in places west of Hsi-su Ho, such as Mu-kou P'o and La-mi, withdrew successively to the east bank of the river, and a Lolo t'u-szu [native chief], or Yang T'u-szu, was established at Ch'ien-wan-kuan [4] to hold together the Lolo in areas both near and distant.

175 At the northern end of Pa Sai the Han-Chinese established 439 a trading post in order to expand their influence westward. 648 North of Shan-Leng Kang is Lan-pa-tzu and further north is Ku-niu Pa. Both these villages can be reached by climbing the mountains from Hsi-ning on the border of P'ing-shan county. From Huang-ts'ao P'ing eastward in Ma-pien county is Yu-cha P'ing which the Han-Chinese have developed for cultivation. During the period of prosperity in the Ch'ing dynasty a large trading post was established there for trade with the Lolo. Further northward lies the Yen-feng Shan area where there are dangerous precipices, overhanging cliffs, old forests, and barren wilderness inaccessible to the Han-Chinese.

131 The northernmost entrance to Ta-liang Shan is Wa-hai. It is a part of the Ta-liang Shan area and occupies quite a wide territory about several tens of li from east to west. Wa-hai is the only entrance to Ta-liang Shan from Ma-pien and O-pien. The distance from Wa-hai to either county seat is about 200 li.

131 It can be reached from Ma-pien westward across Yüeh-erh Pa and Nan-mu P'ing, and by climbing Huang-mao Kang; or from O-pien southward across Ti-tzu Yai and Szu-li P'ing to Wan-shih P'ing, and by passing through a deep forest. From Wa-hai southward are the central regions of Ta-liang Shan. Therefore Wa-hai is the most important junction on the main communication line.

A little more than 200 li south of Wa-hai is the center of Ta-liang Shan called Niu-niu Pa. It is located in the junction between the I-ch'ê Ho and the Lien-cha-nao Ho as they flow into the Mei-ku Ho. It is a level plain with the big mountains directly behind and water on the other three sides. As the communication center of Liang Shan, Niu-niu Pa leads to Lei-po on the east, Yüeh-sui on the west, Chao-chüeh on the southwest, and Wa-hai on the north. It can also be reached from O-pien and Ma-pien. Because of its precipitous strategic position it is an important place for the conquest of Liang Shan.

175 In 1909 a Britisher named Donald Burk led his dozen or more followers from Chien-ch'ang for an exploration trip to 648 Liang Shan, but when his team reached Lien-cha-nao, he was killed by the Lolo and his followers were captured and sold as slaves. The incident almost caused a serious Sino-British dispute. At that time the Chinese governor-general of Szechwan, Chao Erh-feng, immediately ordered the government troops stationed in Chien-ch'ang, O-pien, and Ma-pien to attack Liang Shan with Niu-niu Pa as their destination. Actually, what the government troops did was to employ a native pao-t'ou [headman-protector] as their guide to negotiate for their passage through the region. When they reached Lien-cha-nao, they burned several houses and killed several Lolo. Then they returned to the old military post at Chiao-chio where they built a city and established Chao-chüeh county. Chao Erh-feng undertook to make a drastic change in the administration of the Liang Shan Lolo area. He planned to build a thoroughfare between Lei-po and Chien-ch'ang. The section in Chien-ch'ang was already connected with Chao-chüeh across the Mei-ku Ho to reach Yeh-lu-na-ta. The section in Lei-po was only built to the nearby Shan-leng Kang when work was interrupted by Lolo riots. Afterwards the whole road was destroyed completely by the Lolo. In the first year of the Chinese Republic [1912], government soldiers stationed at Chao-chüeh were withdrawn and the Lolo rebelled. [5] In 1919 the city of Chao-chüeh was captured by the Lolo, who plundered, killed, and caused
131 great misery. Today the major part of Chao-chüeh county is

131 still in the hands of the Lolo. It remains the main passage for the Lolo in Liang Shan to Sikang province. Even the communication line between Hsi-ch'ang and Chao-chüeh is sometimes under their control.

175 Towards the end of the Ch'ing dynasty during the reign of
648 Emperor Kuang-hsü [1875-1907], because of the rebellions of the Lolo who occupied successively all the territories east of Huang-mao Kang, communication lines between the county seats and the towns were disrupted. Nevertheless, during that time the government still had a large number of troops in those areas and held quite a few villages and towns. For example, the area between Huang-lang and Lei-po was still Chinese territory without any disruption in communication. The other villages, such as San-ho K'ou, Yu-cha P'ing, Chung-shan P'ing, Lan-pa-tzu, Shan-leng Kang, Ma-ching-tzu, Hsi-su Chio, Hsiao-wu-chi, and I-tzu Ts'un, all remained in the hands of the Chinese. Although those villages could not be linked together, they still could help each other if something happened. Since the founding of the Republic of China the number of government troops stationed there has decreased and the Lolo have become stronger and more insubordinate. First, the Chinese lost Ch'ang-p'u-t'ien and so the communication line between Lei-po and Huang-lang was interrupted. Then Shan-leng Kang and Ma-ching-tzu were lost so that the western part of the city of Lei-po was threatened. With the loss of Yen-fêng Shan and Yu-cha P'ing, the road from Ma-pien to Ta-liang Shan was disconnected. Furthermore, the Chinese lost San-ho K'ou with the result that the connection between Ma-pien and O'pien was also disrupted. In 1937 the magistrate of Lei-po county, named Lo Mien-nan, was beaten to death by the Lolo at I-tzu Ts'un, but the government took no action against the rioters and since then its influence has further declined. So the Lolo have no fear of the government and have fomented more rebellions and disturbances in the last twenty years.

131 The Ta-liang Shan and Hsiao-liang Shan regions described
162 above cover about 900 li from Ma-pien county in the north to Chin-sha Chiang in the south, and about 600 li from Lei-po in the east to Chao-chüeh in the west. The population of this area, according to the author's estimate of the regions he has covered in the trip, includes approximately 200,000 Lolo.

121 Because of time limitations, the field team led by the author could not travel everywhere in Ta-liang and Hsiao-liang Shan; so we could only use the area of our inspection as the basis for research (see Map 3). From I-pin upstream

000 About 15 li westward from Hsia-ch'i is Szu-li To, a small hamlet of only several tens of households. The district office of P'ing-pien village is located here. The whole district, including Szu-li To, Hsi-ning, and small outposts between these two villages, measures about 70 li from east to west. The second office of the Chung-kuo K'ang-chien K'en-chih Shê is located in Szu-li To. The members of this office are planning to build up Szu-li To as a model village. There is a spring behind it which can be converted with a little bit of engineering help into running water for the village. The purpose of the K'ang-chien K'en-chih Shê is to encourage the cultivators to colonize and develop the border areas. From this village westward are Ma-liu T'ang and Liu-chung Kou, which were formerly wild mountain areas cultivated by the immigrants and are now all bearing corn. Also the members of the same society have begun cultivation westward from Hsi-ning and Lo-san Ch'i and thence southward to Chung-shan P'ing in Lei-po county.

From Szu-li To westward there is only a small, narrow, mountainous passage which is very difficult to traverse. Because of mountain barriers, a person traveling on this road has to wade across the stream, which in the Sha-to area is filled with sand and stones, the water running beneath them. From here to Hu-chia Pao-tzu there are steep precipices and thick forests on both banks. The river itself becomes very narrow and is full of rocks. Therefore it will be difficult to develop the Hsi-ning Ho for navigation. From Hu-chia Pao-tzu to Hsi-ning is more than 10 li. During the Lolo rebellion 175 at the beginning of the Republic period, Hsi-ning was destroyed 648 by fire and Hu-chia Pao-tzu also was attacked by the Lolo several times. Its strong stone walls saved [7] it from destruction, and so today it is the only Han-Chinese village left in the Hsi-ning area; however, it is only inhabited by five or six households.

Hsi-ning is situated on a small level plain in the mountain valley. During a prosperous period in the Ch'ing dynasty it had 2,000 households and was one of the most important key cities in the border area. In the Lolo rebellion of 1920 the whole city was burned down and looted. In recent years 000 different cultivation societies were established here and a new village was erected on the old site, but the houses were built of bamboo and covered with thatch. In the first week of July this year one place in this village caught fire and within two hours the whole village had become ashes. About twenty days

5: Pollard M-5 (no date) 1921 AE4 Lolo AE4

000 the point where the ferry crosses to Nosuland, and it was thought that if the proper warning were given these tribes could easily muster enough men to capture us at the ferry and hold us to a ransom which would bring wealth to the leaders of the men capturing us. This news very much upset the friends with whom we were staying, and they resolved if necessary to make a fight out of the trouble. They considered that it would be to their eternal disgrace if they permitted their guest to be kidnapped or captured by their enemies. Some of the young men were keen on having a big row.

• 175 They always delight in a raid or a clan fight. In the last century, when the great Mohammedan struggle was in full swing in the province of Yunnan, the Chinese sent across and hired a thousand Nosu to fight for them. In the early days of the struggle the Chinese troops were utterly unable to stand up before the rebels. I have been told that over and over again ten followers of the Prophet would defeat and chase in hot pursuit a hundred Chinese. The hillmen were of a very different stamp, and they, with our host Ah-pooh among them, defeated the Mohammedans several times. There was, however, not much advantage from these victories, for the crass Chinese officials pursued their usual insane policy and pocketed the money sent for the pay of the auxiliaries. The Nosu soldiers, of course, resented this, and determined to get equal with those who were squeezing them. One day when there was a big fight on the Nosu allies retired from the contest and left the obnoxious Chinese officials to bear the brunt of the battle. The Mohammedan troops were only too ready to profit by this change and killed a number of their enemies, including the men who had brought about the crisis. After this fight the hillmen returned hom- and, learning a

5: Pollard M-5 (no date) 1921 AE4 Lolo AE4

lesson from the ease with which they had beaten the Mohammedans, they determined to engineer a big raid of their own. The A-lu and Ma clans in the north joined them, and to the number of a thousand they entered Chinese territory in the prefecture of Tong-chuan. On the return home again they were the bearers of immense booty. In the years when the Mohammedans were in rebellion the state of the ordinary people was very pitiable. The old folk tell stories now of the hardships of those days. Some of them have also told me about these raids of the Nosu, when houses were burnt, young people carried off into slavery, and babies dashed to pieces against rocks so that they should not encumber the raiders on their march with their booty. Those were bad old days, and may even come back again.

the Three Kingdoms, and the majority of them obviously could not have been the descendants of Meng Huo. Perhaps this claim is merely an expression of hero worship--in the same way as the Chinese consider themselves descendants of Huang Ti /The Yellow Emperor/--with no further implications. 173

There is another myth among the Lolo concerning the origin of their tribes. It is said that Heaven had three sons: the eldest was an I, the second a Fan (Tibetan), and the youngest a Han. Heaven, favoring the youngest son, gave him the plains; he gave the hilly regions to the second son; and the high mountains and barren lands he left for the eldest (the I).

Of the native tribes in the southwestern part of our country, the Lolo are among the most numerous. They are distributed in the provinces of Szechwan, Sikang and Yünnan. The largest number is found in Yünnan province, next in Sikang province and the Ning districts. The question as to whether these tribes had always lived in these regions or whether they had migrated from elsewhere has yet to be examined. Chinese and Western specialists /94/ have expressed various opinions and have not yet been able to arrive at an agreement. The majority of them, however, think that the I tribes migrated from other places. Both the Chu-shu chi-nien /The Bamboo Annals/ and the T'ung-chien kang-mu /An outline of the Comprehensive Mirror, which is an abridged Chinese history/ maintain that Chih Yu, after his defeat in the north, retreated to the south, then further to the southwest, and lived in seclusion in the mountains. From him sprang the Miao and Lolo tribes of the southwestern border area. In his study "Lu-nan hsiang-tu li-shih ta-kang" /A Summary of the Local History of Lu-nan/ (in Lu-nan-hsien hsiang-t'u k'ao chi-yao)/A Critical Summary of the Local History of Lunan Hsien/ edited by Yang I-po and published by the Middle School of Yünnan University, the seventh month of the twenty eighth year of the Chinese Republic; mimeographed and not for sale) Mr. Li T'ing maintains that the Tibetan-Burmese group of Yünnan province (an intermediate tribal group, one branch of which is known as the I) probably migrated from the northwest. Many Western researchers assert that the Lolo came from the west (e.g., the boundary region between Tibet and Burma). Others think that they migrated westward from Kweichow province. On the other hand, there is also the so-called "indigenous theory" which says that the Lolo are natives of the southwest. This theory is quite possible, for they need not all have migrated. In this case the present-day Lolo of Liang-shan are no doubt the descendants 131 173 166 175

175 of the southwestern I, with whom Ssue-ma Hsiang-ju /Chinese writer of the second century B.C./ communicated in the Han period. It is probable that the Miao tribes of Hunan and Kweichow provinces originally lived in fertile plains and valleys but were later forced by the Chinese to retreat into the mountains. The Lolo of Liang-shan, however, have always occupied the entire Liang-shan region. They preferred to live on high mountains even though their cultivated fields are centered around mountain streams.

181 512 The Lolo are a peaceful and contented agricultural people. They are singularly frugal and grave in temperament; they neither laugh nor talk easily. This is especially true of the I of Liang-shan. They work in the rice fields throughout the day, return home at nightfall, and go to sleep immediately after the evening meal. There is hardly any singing or dancing. They form a strong contrast to the nomadic, unrestrained, and pleasure-loving Tibetans.

177 The majority of the Lolo in Yünnan have been very much sinified so that their original customs and habits have almost entirely disappeared. Only those living in the northern border close to Huei-li /a hsien in Sikang/ and in a section further south, as well as those in the district of Lu-nan hsien, keep some of their former manners. Most of their original traits, however, are still retained among the I people in the Ning districts, in Lei /Lei-po/, Ma /Ma-pien/, Ô /O-pien/, P'ing P'ing-shan/ of Szechwan province, and especially in the Liang-shan 565 egion. The Lolo of these regions are divided into two distinct social classes: the "Heh-I" and the "Wa-tzu." But this distinction is not found among all the Lolo tribes in Yünnan, and it is hard to say whether it once prevailed in all other places. Since most primitive societies still retain this type of social system, we assume--but do not venture to assert categorically--that it was originally practiced in all Lolo societies but was later abandoned by some groups that came under Chinese influence. It is also possible that this system had always existed in some regions and not at all in others.

For a thorough study of the Lolo problem, "Heh-I" and "Wa-tzu" are two technical terms which must be understood. The former designates the nobility among the Lolo (called Sepo in the Lolo language). The word "Heh" /black/ has no special significance. (The complexion of the Heh-I is in fact somewhat darker than that of the Chinese, but the so-called "Wa-tzu" or "Pê-I" /Pê means white/ are not really fairer than the Heh-I.) "Wa-tzu" (meaning children)--probably a word borrowed from the Chinese--is used to designate the slaves, who are

Such an attainment would be a great contribution toward the advancement of the I society. 000

THE HISTORY OF THE I TROUBLES IN LIANG-SHAN

Chinese influence never really reached Liang-shan in the past two thousand years. Although the region was formerly under the jurisdiction of Szechwan province, as indicated by maps, this control was not exercised in actuality, and the region remained non-assimilated. Westerners even call it "the independent Lolo region." In the Ch'ing dynasty, Chinese territories included such outlying regions as Ch'inghai and Tibet. Liang-shan, though situated near the southwestern border, was a part of China proper; nevertheless, the names of the nearby administrative districts--Ma-pien and O-pien /pien means frontier/ (both names adopted in the Ch'ing period)--seem to indicate that Liang-shan has always been regarded as a frontier. The emperors of the early Ch'ing period were warlike and sent large-scale expeditions everywhere, reaching as far north as Outer Mongolia and as far west as Tibet. Why they overlooked the tiny Liang-shan region alone needs to be explained. Mr. Hsu Hsiao-hui stated that he had investigated all the historical materials of the Ch'ing dynasty to trace the matter to its source. Finally he found the entire story in the Sheng wu chi /Record of the Imperial Campaigns/ and the Ta-ch'ing i-t'ung chih /Record of the Unification of the Great Ch'ing Empire/. He discovered from these two books that in the first years of Emperor Ch'ien-lung's reign the court mobilized large armies from seven provinces, and sent them under the command of Marshal Yueh Chung-ch'i to conquer Ta Chin-chuan and Hsiao Chin-chuan. But the expedition met with difficulties on the way and was handicapped from the start. So some high officials of the imperial court sought audience with the queen mother and suggested that these grandiose campaigns were unnecessary for such minor incidents. Thereupon the queen mother reprimanded Ch'ien-lung, who found himself in an embarrasting situation. Just at this time the imperial army suddenly scored a victory and subdued the rebels at Chin-chuan. A difficult problem for the Emperor was thus resolved. But the expedition had cost millions of taels, which was a huge sum for the time, and the Treasury was drained. The Emperor, therefore, greatly pleased at the outcome of the Chin-chuan campaign, was anxious to recall the troops. At this moment, however, a blundering Viceroy of Szechwan memorialized the Throne, urging it to take this opportunity to send 175 •

175 the soldiers who had annihilated the rebels at Chin-chuan to conquer Liang-shan. He aroused the anger of the Emperor who sternly reproached him. Thereafter no one dared speak of the pacification of Liang-shan.

According to Mr. Ch'ang Lung-ch'ing's record, however, there were at least two more petitions to the Emperor to attack the Liang-shan reg on. The first was made in the eighteenth year of Tao-kuang's reign. /119/ The Viceroy of Szechwan, Su T'ing-yü, preparing for the defense of the frontier, found the I insubordinate and rebellious. Hitherto, they only surrendered reluctantly to the government whenever they were hard pressed by sporadic assaults, which had little effect on frontier affairs, but resulted only in more rebellions. It would have been necessary to send large forces to secure a lasting peace. So together with General K'ai Chang of Ch'engtu and Governor-general Chang Pi-lu of Szechwan, Su memorialized the throne, asking for an appropriation of 3,000,000 taels for the soldiers' rations and pay, and an army of 20,000 government and native soldiers to make a final concerted attack by taking four routes at the same time through O-pien, Yueh-sui, Ma-pien, and Lei-po. (It happened that the I of Ma-pien were making trouble at the time so that Su and the others were given an opportunity to memorialize the emperor.) They were, however, sternly reprimanded by imperial decree, which stated that such measures had never been used for handling frontier affairs. They were found to be at fault and demoted. The second memorial to the throne was made by Yü-T'eng, Sub-prefect Judge of Ō-pien, in the eleventh year of T'ung-chih's reign. At that time frontier situations were getting worse everyday, and to cope with the I affairs, the sub-prefecture had to expend huge sums which far exceeded its revenue. So Yü petitioned for an army to destroy the Heh-I by attacking all the I bases, to force them to deliver their leaders for execution and to return the men and animals which they had captured. Only this plan, Yü argued, could bring about lasting peace and control of the I. The imperial decree, nevertheless, rebuked him severely, stating that "the Heh-I are also the children of Heaven and Earth. How can one allow them to be exterminated? Besides, to exterminate is not easy; therefore refrain from it." The Ch'ing Empire began to collapse afterwards and I troubles became even more difficult to handle.

Although the lax policies adopted in the Ch'ing period never completely solved the I problem in Liang-shan, some attempts were at least made to meet the situation. The government laid equal emphasis on defense and pacification. In defense, it established at

all the strategic places around Liang-shan, military guard-posts where soldiers were stationed in order to prevent the I from slipping out. 175 ●
Most of these places still retain the names they had as camps, and from this we can judge the strict defense measures taken at the time. In the four hsien of Lei, Ma, Ô, P'ing in Szechwan province there were altogether 138 of these posts, distributed in more than 57 places, and the soldiers numbered something in excess of 10,000. The annual expenditure for I affairs exceeded 300,000 taels of silver and was about half the land revenue of Szechwan province towards the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. The importance of this problem may thus be deduced. In spite of these strict defenses the I continued to make trouble, and though no large campaigns were undertaken, clashes on a small-scale were quite frequent in the Ch'ing times. There were quite a few local military officers who gained rewards for military successes and who won the affection and support of the Chinese people. One of these heroes is Liu T'ing-chen, whose shrine stands today on the Lu Mountain in the vicinity of Hsi-ch'ang. The local officials also took advantage of the distance which separated this region from the court. Purposely stirring up troubles, they attacked the I on the slightest pretext, and then made false reports magnifying the smallest success to procure honors and promotion for themselves. Through the years there have been many who have prospered in this manner. Mu-kou-p'o, the one-time boundary division between the Lolo and Chinese in Lei-po hsien, appeared frequently in memorials to the Emperor; it helped not a few officials in Ch'engtu to wear red buttons on their caps /to get promotion/ even though they actually had no idea of its location. /120/ These conditions were of course demoralizing. Chinese influence, however, 175 177
has been gradually penetrating into Liang-shan: in the west it has extended from Hsi-ch'ang to Chu-heh and in the east from Lei-po to San-leng-kang in Heh-chiao. Some assert that it has already reached Huang-mo-keng. Meanwhile the I can only retreat into the surrounding mountains. In the first year of Hsüan-t'ung's reign, Chao Erh-sun attacked Liang-shan and tried to control the I by establishing at the site of the former garrison posts the walled city of Chao-chüeh hsien. Thus the court's authority was somewhat restored.

In addition to these defense measures and sporadic attacks, the 175
Ch'ing court also attempted to subdue the Liang-shan Lolo through en- 624
ticement or some form of appeasement. It included the appointment of the I as officials, guards of hills and roads, and attendants. (20)

20. Detailed information concerning the application of these

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methods may be found in Szu-ch'uan-sheng Lei-Ma-O-P'ing t'iao-ch'a-chi /Record of the Investigation of Lei, Ma, O, P'ing of Szechwan Province/ compiled by Ch'ang Lung-ch'ing and others, and published by the West-China Science Institute, Pei-p'ei, /Szechwan/, 24th year of the Chinese Republic. /1935/.

Titles such as t'u-ssu, ch'ien-hu /headman of thousand-families/, pai-hu, /headman of hundred families/, etc., were conferred upon the I officials. The official status of an appointee depended directly upon the influence of the branch to which he belonged. Through its inherent appeal, this system might have obtained results elsewhere, but in Liang-shan, where the I are like scattered sand and their branches mutually independent, it is of little use. Furthermore, most of the Heh-I, considering themselves superior and noble, look down upon the Chinese and have little interest in these official posts except for their salary. Devices such as having them protect hills and roads and work as attendants have obtained only slightly better results. During the Ch'ing period, the I were tolerated as long as they did not formally rebel, plunder, or kidnap people, but they were allowed to be arrogant and contemptuous of the Chinese. This explains why later, in the first years of the Chinese Republic, I troubles grew so rampant as to be beyond control.

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In addition to the last battle at Niu-niu-pa under the command of Chao Erh-sun, two other campaigns against the I of Liang-shan during the Ch'ing period are worth mentioning. In the seventeenth year of Tao-kuang's reign, the I of Lei-po began to cause trouble over a negligible incident. The Szechwan Governor-general Yü Pu-yün, with an army of 1,800 militiamen, 3,800 regular soldiers, and 500 garrison soldiers from Chin-ch'uan, led an attack from Lei-po, and going through Wu-chia-pa, Yang-tzu-ch'iao, Ta-ku-tuz and Hsiao-ku-tuz, he entered I-ch'ê and continued into the valley of the Mei-ku River to cut diagonally across Liang-shan. He then withdrew the army from Yüeh-sui, having spread his military influence far and wide. The second attack was in the seventh year of T'ung-chih's reign when Chou Chien-wa, a provincial commander-in-chief, led his army from Hsi-ch'ang into Liang-shan and reached Niu-niu-pa. The fighting lasted long into the night and ended in a rout. His officer, Regiment-commander Yang, was killed in action. Although the losses were high, he was able to pacify the entire mountain and establish a fortress at the intersection, which laid the basis for the building later of the walled

city at Chao-chüeh.

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/121/In the first years of the Ch'ing dynasty, the frontier areas were awed into submission by the strong military power of the government. But the ignorant I of Liang-shan continued to cause sporadic troubles although they did not dare revolt on a large scale. The authority of Chinese officials could still reach Liang-shan at that time. In the middle of the dynasty, however, the situation grew worse and the I became more insubordinate. The copper mines in Wu-po, for example, had to stop operation in Tao-kuang's reign. During the most flourishing period there were 14 copper and iron mines in Lei-po hsien. In all of them mining operations, which began in Chia-ch'ing's reign, came to a halt in Tao-kuang's reign when I troubles were becoming quite uncontrollable. From the time of Hsien-feng's reign, the Lolo became even more seditious. The bulk of Lei-po hsien, for example, fell into their hands. But court authority was not yet entirely destroyed, and the I were still somewhat fearful of the government and had to yield whenever the officials adopted a very positive attitude. Important points of communication and the guarded areas were still in the hands of the Chinese. Chao Erh-sun's attack on Liang-shan during Hsüan-t'ung's reign therefore had a speedy success.

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The situation was quickly reversed after the Revolution of 1911. Formerly military expenses of the hsien were appropriated from provincial funds, but soon after the establishment of the Republic, these provinces came under the control of various warlords, and the funds were no longer available. Without them the armies stationed there for defense had to be transferred elsewhere. Guard-camps were dispersed and defense was maintained by men drafted from local districts. These men had neither battle experience nor appropriate training and could not match the soldiers formerly stationed there. Moreover, the 2,000 militia in the three hsien of Lei, Ma, Ô, constituted only about one fifth of the total number of soldiers stationed there during the Ch'ing period, and their strength was also proportionately reduced. In the meantime military pay and rations were not appropriated in the first years of the Republic, and the expenses required for the pacification of the I had to be provided for by each hsien itself. Economic difficulties prevented prompt payment of salaries to the previously appointed native headmen; this also prompted the I to rebel. In addition to plunder and revolt, gradual encroachment upon neighboring territories was also a common occurrence. Even then, in spite of the large-scale withdrawal of troops, the "paper tiger" of the former Ch'ing period was

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not yet entirely exposed, and the I dared not make organized revolts on a large scale. Later the provincial government of Szechwan became more corrupt. The more than 200 Lolo detained as hostages in the prisons of the four hsien of Lei, Ma, Ô, P'ing in the Ch'ing times--their situation had kept the Lolo in some fear--were now released with a ransom by a group of corrupt officials seeking profit. The number of imprisoned I, most of whom belong to some unimportant branches, decreased to fewer than ten in each hsien. Thus the fear among the Lolo was greatly diminished and schemes for insurrection were hatched.

After the fifth year of the Republic, the Government of Szechwan province entered a period of confusion. In the seventh or eighth year of the Republic, warlords fought for control, creating almost a world of chaos. Poor soil and meager products induced few to concern themselves with the frontier districts of Lei, Ma, Ô, where I troubles were constant. Those guarding these places were mostly bandits /122/ and the like, who thought only of collecting money and had not the slightest interest in defense measures against the I or in governing them. The most important military man among the contenders for control of these districts was Yang Ch'un-fang, who had twice been stationed at the town of Lei-po (once in the fifth year of the Republic, and another time in the seventh year). At that time opium was very expensive in the Chinese regions while the I were short of magazine rifles. Yang gave them nine-bullet clip rifles in return for opium. Each gun was exchanged for 100 taels of opium. Yang profited tenfold in the transaction, while the I were able to arm themselves. (This type of smuggling was carried on since then and was not eliminated until recent years when it was strictly suppressed by the government.) There must have been at least 1,000 rifles smuggled into Liang-shan by Yang. The bandits in the secluded mountains of these hsien followed suit--selling guns and buying opium--thus contributing greatly to the expansion of the armed forces of the I. The latter then took advantage of the confusion caused by soldiers and bandits and set out on a large-scale offensive, robbing, kidnapping, burning, killing and occupying territories, and were more difficult than ever to subdue. The leading criminal who contributed to the outburst of such I violence is really the "originator of evil," Yang Ch'un-fang.

Around the seventh year of the Republic the majority of the defense armies of Lei, Ma, Ô, were successively transferred to join the civil war. Most of the weapons left at the local government offices

were seized by army bandits; there was hardly any force left to resist the attack of the Lolo. Everywhere they became reckless and fearless and retained no respect whatever for the Chinese. In the eighth year of the Republic, the Lolo of Liang-shan began a large-scale offensive. This rebellion was instigated by the prominent branches of En-cha and Wu-ch'i of Lei-po hsien, Wu-po of Ma-pien hsien, A-ho and Su-ko of Yueh-sui hsien, and Pa-chü (also known as Pa-ch'i) and A-shih of Chao-chüeh hsien. These large branches united all the I of Liang-shan into a systematic organization, and taking separate routes, marched toward the Chinese territory. Finally in May of that year, they broke through the guard-posts of Ma-ch[illegible]ng-tzŭ in Lei-po hsien; in June they occupied the city of San-lêng-kang and captured about 800 people, 380 soldiers, and more than 100 rifles. All of Lei-po west of Wu-chiao, extending for more than 100 li, was lost to the I; territories such as Tung-ning-hsiang and Li-tzŭ-p'ing in the eastern section of Lei-po were also lost. In June of the same year, the city of Chao-chüeh hsien, attacked by the combined forces of Pa-cha chia and A-shih chia, fell, and the entire hsien was occupied by the I, as were the guard-posts of Yu-cha-p'ing and Yen-feng in Ma-pien hsien. Only Kan chia of O-pien did not participate in this uprising. It was a strictly organized military maneuver, careful in planning, swift in movement, and vast in scope. The Chinese could not react in time and suffered heavy losses. All their lands and properties were seized, their houses burned, and the streets ruined. The foundation upon which the Chinese were gradually able to make a stand through hundreds of years was swept away in one stroke. Several ten thousands of Chinese men and women either fled, were killed, /123/ or captured to become Wa-tzu; there hardly was anyone fortunate enough to escape. The I who had swept out of their mountain fastness succeeded in reaching Lei-po on the east, Hsi-ch'ang on the west and O-pien on the north, in all which places they struck directly at the hsien cities. Although these did not fall, they were nevertheless in imminent danger. The vast outlying districts between the cities were naturally beyond Chinese control. I troubles were worst in the ten years from the eighth to the seventeenth year of the Republic. The inhabitants in all the surrounding hsien feared for their own safety, and even local officials were often killed. There are two outstanding examples. In the ninth year of the Republic, the I in the sub-hsien of Peng-tzŭ-tsun revolted and murdered the assistant magistrate Huang Lung-hsun; and in the autumn of the fifteenth year, the magistrate Lo Cheng-kuan was also murdered in Peng-tzu-tsun

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175 in addition to a loss of 500 guns.
669 After the eighteenth year, order in Szechwan province was gradually restored, and the I were more submissive. At the same time there were also a few local military commanders who were able to subjugate the I more effectively. In the nineteenth year, Regiment-commander Wang Lin-sheng personally led an army to enter Liang-shan from Lei-po, felling trees to clear roads and binding bamboos to make bridges; then, going through Ta-ku-tui and Hsiao-ku-tui, he attacked Huang-mo-keng. On the way the army camped for about seven days at Li-chia-tsao and organized the Wa-tzu around the neighborhood into pao-chia /tithings/. Although Wang withdrew from Liang-shan not long after, this was the first time since the Republic that the military influence of the Chinese extended west of Mu-kou-p'o. But the man who had the most effective control over the I in the last 20 odd years was Teng Hsiu-t'ing, who made several expeditions into the area of Chao-chüeh, San-wan-ho, Szu-k'uai-pa-tzu, and almost recaptured Chao-chüeh city. Unfortunately the outbreak of the civil war in Szechwan cut short his success. Even today the Lolo of Liang-shan fear the name of Teng, which they evoke in order to stop children from crying. From this one can see that action only can bring about results and that it is not impossible to conquer Liang-shan.

175 In recent years, Chinese policy toward the I stresses land re-
311 clamation. This matter was first directed by the 24th army. In the seventeenth year of the Republic the army reorganized the Development Department of Lei, Ma, O, P'ing, with the aim of constructing highways running through these four hsien. They were, however, unable to carry out this plan though slight progress was made in the reclamation of lands. Later a rearrangement of military districts put these hsien under the jurisdiction of the 17th division of the Szechwan army. Around the twenty-fifth year, this division established a reclamation farm at Ch'ing-k'o of Lei-po hsien, and Company-commander Fan Yung-hui was appointed director in charge of the reclamation program. Fan was a capable man, and his chief assistants were soldiers from the original 17th division. With sufficient strength and strict organization, his method of using troops as farmers easily attained results. Within five years after the establishment of this farm many of the cultivable barren lands previously occupied and laid waste by the I were opened up. The local people say that after the eighth year of the Republic, nine-tenths of Lei-po hsien had fallen to the I. /124/ After these endeavors the land was partially recovered, although

eight-tenths of the entire hsien was still in I hands up to the thirtieth year. In addition to Lei-po, the hsien of Ma-pien and O-pien also made similar efforts. Later, around the twenty-ninth year, the government of Szechwan again established a Reclamation Bureau for Lei, Ma, O, P'ing, and Mr. Jen Ying-ts'ang was appointed as head. He maintained the status quo of the reclamation work but put it entirely under the Bureau's control. After ten years these attempts at reclamation have produced considerable results. Unfortunately, political measures were not in keeping with these efforts so that conflicts between the Chinese and I are worse than ever. The I are very resentful over reclamation, for they think that the Chinese are using military power to seize their territories. Their enmity toward the Chinese has grown to such a degree that recently the I of O-pien, who have never rebelled, have also begun to agitate. Henceforth it may be borne in mind that there are disadvantages as well as advantages in the program. At any rate this is definitely not the way for a complete settlement of the I region. From now on, those who would discuss reclamation should consider every point in detail before taking action.

Shortly after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Government moved west, and the problem of the I region of Liang-shan gradually came to the attention of the public. After the organization of Sikang into a province, rehabilitation of the Ning districts was considered one of the important projects. A committee for investigating I affairs in these districts was established. It was later reorganized as the "Reclamation Committee of the Ning Districts," with a larger scope of duties, although I affairs were still its main concern. Great progress was made within three years. Aggression and appeasement policies--with more emphasis on the latter--were tried at the same time. Although the basic principles are the same as those adopted in the Ch'ing period, these methods produced better results because of more skillful operations and stricter organization. Take, for instance, the city of Chao-chüeh which fell in the eighth year of the Republic and remained in I hands for 20 years. Although the provincial government formerly appointed a magistrate, this magistrate always lived in Hsi-ch'ang and never went into the hsien to perform his duties. The city was reconquered in the twenty-eighth year, but in January of the thirtieth year, it again fell into the hands of the rebellious Pa-chü chia. In March of the same year, however, the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Hsi-ch'ang and the Reclamation Committee sent combined forces to attack and regained it. Communication between Hsi-ch'ang and Cha

669 175 636 Chao-chüeh was again restored under Chinese control. The peculiar situation of the past 20 years was thus brought to an end, marking the progress made recently concerning I affairs.

The majority of those conversant with I affairs agree that the policy toward the I region of Liang-shan must depend somewhat on military strength and repression. Formerly, however, /125/ most 669 175 people have had two kinds of mistaken notions concerning this problem, which should be corrected here. One was the feeling that Liang-shan was difficult to conquer; the other was the belief that a complete military conquest of Liang-shan was necessary in order to produce results. It will now be shown why neither of these two notions is actually correct. First, the combat strength of the I has been overrated. It is true that in the last few centuries the Lolo often made troubles, which became particularly violent after the establishment of the Republic. A close scrutiny, however, reveals that the inability to conquer Liang-shan in former times was really due to the fact that conquest was never attempted. The I caused sporadic disturbances, but they generally dispersed upon the arrival of large troops. If there had been foresight during the Ch'ing period and some soldiers had been sent to occupy the strategic grounds of Niu-niu-pa and Yeh-lu-na-ta inside Liang-shan, these problems would have been resolved long ago and would not have recurred today. It is true that there is certain unity among the I, who can also at times make swift and ingenious military moves. These circumstances, together with topographic difficulties and lack of roads and provisions along the way, may have caused some Chinese commanders to feel that it was a difficult task to subdue the I of Liang-shan. Nevertheless, the obstacles are by no means greater than those found in regions such as Sikang, Tibet, Ch'ing-hai and Mongolia, where military expeditions undertaken during the first years of the Ch'ing period were successful. There would be no difficulty in achieving success in as tiny a region as Liang-shan if the whole matter could be treated seriously and detailed planning be done beforehand, so that the troops might advance with confidence and care, constructing bridges and roads, establishing military posts and securing provisions along the way. Because of their observance of these requirements, famous commanders in the past, such as Liu T'ing-chen of the late Ch'ing period and Teng Hsiu-t'ing of the Republic times, were always victorious in their expeditions against the I. In the past 20 years, some militarists have increased the strength of the Lolo considerably through the unlawful exchange

of guns for opium. However the only weapons of the I are rifles, pistols and muskets, the firing power of which is much inferior to that of the commonly used firearms such as the machine guns and trench motars of the government's regular army. Furthermore, the I, lacking bullets and practice, are unable to aim accurately. Some friends, who have traveled in other I regions, state that the I are most fearful of good marksmen. In a surprise attack, therefore, if one should first kill one or two attackers with a gun, then those remaining, regardless of their number, would all disperse at once. The Lolo of Liang-shan are probably no exception. The recapture of Chao-chieh city in March of the thirtieth year exemplifies the fact that those with superior weapons can win. In this battle, with only a few soldiers, the government army had to meet a large number of enemies. As it was besieging the city, the I again occupied San-ko-ho and blocked the rear route. But thanks to the machine guns, the army was victorious. Many of those familiar with conditions in Liang-shan believe that if only the government would dispatch a very fine regiment of modern troops, it could without doubt subdue Liang-shan completely. The writer agrees with them. It would be easiest for the troops to take the route eastward from Hai-ch'ang /126/ and make a direct attack on Huang-mo-keng. Naturally the desired result would be even more quickly attained if the military force was more substantial and attacks were made from all sides. The total number of I in Liang-shan is not large, and available fighters are therefore limited. In former battles they seemed numerous because they assembled from all places. Since they ran very fast and were also familiar with the geography of the region, they could spread news much faster than government troops. If a large army could be speedily assembled and correct military strategy used, the Lolo would not be able to resist. Formerly, because of the amazing speed with which the I assembled in answer to a call, it was believed that they had enormous manpower. The fear thus aroused was due to a false understanding of the situation. The Chinese living in the frontier regions dread the I because the latter are armed while they are not. The solution henceforth is to give a suitable number of weapons to the Chinese so that they may have some means of self-defense. I problems which cause authorities much vexation will thus be greatly reduced. Furthermore the troops sent to occupy Liang-shan must have particularly fine equipment and strict discipline. Only thus will it be possible to avoid some of the evil practices of former times, such as trading guns for opium, and to preserve peace in the I region forever.

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7: Clarke M-3 (no date) 1911 AE5 Miao
Lolo AE4

Perhaps the saddest fact about the No-su is the rapidity with which they are dying out at the present time in the north-west of Kweichow and north-east of Yunnan. The unsanitary conditions in which they live—the water they drink is often drawn from stagnant pools fouled by sheep and cattle—and their riotous indulgence in whisky, opium, and other vices, sufficiently account for this. Such decadence of the race has given the strong an opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of the weak, so that quarrelling and fighting about the division of land is always going on. They are burdened with the thought that their doom as a race is sealed. Some of them gather a little consolation from the coming of Christianity, and hope that it means the arrest of their decline. It may be, however, that the missionaries have arrived too late, for when deterioration of that sort sets in among any race it is difficult to arrest it.

When the Manchus came to China the No-su were practically independent, and the city of Chaotung did not then exist. The Manchus brought Yunnan and Kweichow under effective Imperial control. The campaign against the No-su of Chaotung and Weining was successful, and these were brought under Chinese rule.

7: Clarke M-3 (no date) 1911 AE5 Miao
Lolo AE4

175 622 The Chinese, however, did not interfere between the lairds and their tenants, and left things very much as they were. As long as the lairds pay taxes, recognise the sovereignty of China, and make no serious trouble, they are let alone. When the laird is a strong, just man, the present system works well; but when he is a cruel tyrant, as many of them are, holding practically the power of life and death over his retainers and tenants, cruel things are very often done in those regions.

691 622 661 It is seldom that the tenants of these lairds are engaged in litigation before the Chinese magistrates, as their landlords settle all disputes for them which they cannot settle among themselves. This is doubtless a very good thing for the tenants, even though the laird may often be unjust in his decisions. The lairds themselves, however, are constantly at law with one another in the Chinese courts, and this is an opportunity for the magistrates to enrich themselves. The lairds are generally represented in these actions by their Chinese agents. It is said that very few of them dare enter a Chinese city because of the many serious and even capital charges laid against them in the Yamens. If they did enter the city of their district, they might be apprehended, and in that case mercilessly squeezed.

2: Wiens G-4 (no date) 1954 AF17 South China
Lolo AEH

able. (Eickstedt here referred inexplicably several times to the light-skin pigment as characteristic of the Black-bone Lolo, who are usually described by the Chinese as dark-skinned.) Racially, he said, the Black-bone Lolo are no more related to the southern agricultural Lolo than to the White-bone. From this it would seem probable that the so-called Lolo of Yun-nan in reality are peoples subjugated by the Black-bone Lolo who, after becoming Lolo in culture and forgetting their former cultures, were forced by the pressure of their own multiplication to migrate in search of land. The Black-bone Lolos in the meantime stayed behind in their Ta-liang stronghold.

In any case the Han-Chinese have known of the Lolo in their present habitat for over 2500 years. Ssu-ma Ch'ien mentions them during the Later Chou period and pointed out ethnographical characteristics, among them the custom of wearing the hair in a forward-pointing horn, a practice still in effect. Legend, the sphere of economy, culture, and language, said Eickstedt, point unquestionably to the northern part of the East Tibetan mountain land as their early home, the region presently occupied by the Hsi-Fan. Like the Miao, they, too, were subjected to the population pressures from the northwest desert lands, where droughts and wars led to the migration of splinter groups from the high steppes of Eastern Tibetia southward along the steppe-land corridor. This western high steppe corridor afforded them a special economic adaptation not open to the rice and wheat farmers. This economic relationship provided for lines of least resistance leading to similar geographical landscapes in the south tied in with the high mountains and meadows of southwest China. In Ssu-ch'uan as Eickstedt pointed out, the lines of tribal migration crossed each other, and there was the development of stratified lines of movement.[83]

Just when the Lolo entered the present stronghold area is unknown, but probably in the early Chou or pre-Chou period. Ling Shun-sheng believed they migrated from Yun-nan into Kuei-chou during the Ch'in and Han periods where they found the aboriginal Ch'i-lao, a T'ai group, already in occupation of the land.[84] The great chief of the Lolo in Kuei-chou during the time of the Three Kingdoms was of the An Clan. When the Marquis Wu (Chu-ko Liang) conquered South China for the Ssu-ch'uan Han Dynasty, this Lolo chief was Lo Chi-huo with his seat of rule at Chien-ning in northeast Yun-nan. His tribe was

L 175 called the Lo-tien and became the foundation for the Lo-tien State.[85] Since this early period the Lolo have become quite widespread in Kuei-chou as well as in Yun-nan. We shall come back to their distribution and present situation in a later chapter. Much remains to be done in searching out the history of the Lolo peoples.

Y 174 9. The History and Migrations of the Yao and Their Relation to the Yueh

The Yao culture was looked on by Eberhard as a proto-Austronesian culture related to the Tan boat culture; only, he believed the Yao to be Austronesians who developed a land culture in contrast to that of the Tan.[86] However, he found it hard to say to which major group the Yao belong. Yao culture has little in common with that of the Austro-Asiatics. On the other hand, that they have linguistic similarities with Chuang (or T'ai) does not prove anything, he contended. The Yao in Che-chiang Province have completely given up their language and speak Han-Chinese. Moreover, Chuang influence upon Yao culture is to be expected and has been established.[87]

Eickstedt wrote that we must view the Yao as the most ancient inhabitants of Southwest China and the original inhabitants of the Yueh that the Han-Chinese first knew as a vague political entity only about 474 B.C. He asserted that the Chuang are none other than the T'ai-ized Yao or pre-Yao and said that the Yao were the original inhabitants of the Chinese coastal provinces.[88] Hsu Sung-shih agreed with this for the eastern mountain lands but denied this for the southeast coastal area where he said the Chuang tribes long preceded the Yao people in Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi.[89] Chiang Ying-liang proposed a theory quite different from the usual by contending that the Yao are merely Miao under a different name which they acquired when the Miao entered Ling-nan.[90] It is evident that substantiated knowledge of the origin of the Yao needs further searching.

Y 175 167 651 Let us examine Chiang's argument first, for his theory reverses the general direction of migratory trends of the Yao as described by other scholars; that is, he had the Yao moving northeastward along the coastal provinces instead of southwestward. He stated that the west-migrating Wu-ch'i Man entered Kuei-chou from Hu-nan and were known to the later world as Miao. However, the Miao that

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175 language, and so forth. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the great king Gia-Long accentuated this influence still further by sending into the most remote valleys selected mandarins, who had orders to settle in the country, to take wives there, and there to found families. As we shall see later, the numerous unions thus contracted were the origin of a race of aristocratic half-breeds, known under the name of "Tho-Ti," who still hold in our day important administrative functions.

The successors of Gia-Long were unable to demonstrate the same firmness and skill as the great king. Brigandage and anarchy soon reappeared in the Tonkinese valleys of the Si Kiang, where the Annamite mandarins, no longer supported by the central authority, showed themselves unable to repress the disorders stirred up by the local chiefs, who were frequently joined by Chinese pillagers and adventurers, notably the bands of the Tai-Ping.

It is in this condition that we found the northeast frontier provinces of Tonkin at the moment of the French occupation, and a long series of military operations were required to establish in these regions the order which reigns there at the present time.

The Basins of the Red River

At the beginning of recorded history, it appears that the peoples of Yunnan were under the domination of two great races: the "Thai" and the "Lolo."

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175 The "Thai" occupied western Yunnan, where they composed two large kingdoms: that of Ngai-Lao (Tali-Fou); and that of Bat-Ba-Tuc-Phu (Pou-Eurl). The several "Thai" tribes, in migration towards the south, moved farther into the valley of the Mekong, absorbing, driving back, or reducing to slavery the aboriginal populations, and advancing towards the south until they came into contact with the Khmers (Cambodia). Certain of their elements obliqued to the east towards the valleys of the Black River and of the Red River.

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175 The "Lolo" likewise composed two large kingdoms (White Lolo and Black Lolo), which extended over southern Szechwan, and central and eastern Yunnan.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LOLO AND XA ETHNIC GROUPS

Section 1

Origin of the Lolo--Their Way of Life

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175 The Lolo form an ethnic group which, according to Father Vial, originated in the regions located between Burma and Tibet. They have inhabited Yunnan and Szechwan for long centuries. Chinese Annals describe them as being divided into two kingdoms in the sixth century B.C. The first, called the Kingdom of Tien, was made up of tribes of White Lolo and occupied western Yunnan. The other, that of the Tsouan or Black Lolo, was situated in eastern Yunnan. The Kingdom of Nam Chieu, which was founded later in the eighth century of our era, and whose hordes invaded the valley of the Red River in 860, was composed of Thai and Lolo peoples.

Finally Truong Vinh Ky reports in his Annamese history an invasion of Tonkin made in the sixteenth century of our era by a wild tribe which he calls Hac La La and which came from Yunnan. Now the name La or Lala refers to the Lolo, and the word hac in the Sino-Annamese language means "black." Then it is a question of the Black Lolo. This invasion, moreover, which was victoriously repelled by General Le Minh, must have left a few families in the high region who did not return across the frontier.

Aside from these incursions, the immigration of the Lolo into Tonkin must go back very long ago, for certain of their tribes believe they are aborigines. One of them, the Penti Lolo, bears a name which has that meaning. The various varieties inhabiting Tonkin of whom we shall give a sketch /146/ are: The White Lolo, the Black Lolo, the La Qua or Penti Lolo, the Phu La, and the La ti. They account for one percent of the population of the high region.

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156 The Lolo type is most handsome of any in the entire area. The men are of a wiry, vigorous constitution, and the women are graceful, rather pretty, and have more slender figures than most of the other mountain women. If one compares them with the Meo, near whom they usually live, one notices that the Lolo are more stalwart but more indolent, more intelligent and capable of a much higher